Thursday, February 03, 2005

Next Iran?

George W. Bush has a reputation for being a straight shooter, the kind of leader who sends a clear, decisive message to the nation's adversaries in the war on terrorism. But as the Americans try to persuade Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions, the White House has been sending out mixed messages as to what would be the most appropriate course of action.

After declaring that America would not rule out military action against Iran, Vice-President Dick Cheney added that "the Israelis might well decide to act first and let the rest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterward."

Adding to further intrigue, President Bush cheered Iranian hawks pushing for regime change by declaring that "as you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you." In the same breath, he offered to the pro-diplomacy camp that "we are working with European allies" who are at the negotiating table with Iran.

Later Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked, "The Iranian regime's human-rights behavior is something to be loathed." But then she stressed that attacking Iran was not on the agenda "at this point."

Confusion could be the intended effect, part of a game to keep the Iranians guessing and off-balanced. The problem is that the Iranians, who insist that they have a sovereign right to enrich uranium for peaceful and civilian purposes, are quite good at playing their own games.

By dragging out the third round of negotiations with Britain, France and Germany, the Iranians are doing little to build confidence in its good intentions. Tehran has since repeatedly rebuffed demands to put its uranium-enrichment program on ice and has continued to upgrade a uranium-enrichment plant south of the country.

Adding to the incrimination, an Iranian opposition group based in Paris has alleged that Tehran has completed designs on a prototype detonator for a nuclear bomb. Learning from the North Koreans, the Iranians have been extending the negotiating process while continuing work on their nuclear program.

Despite repeated entreaties from European government officials, the Americans have refused to join the multilateral talks, which center on persuading Iran to abandon its program in exchange for economic and political goodies.

This is classic European good-cop and American bad-cop, with both sides sharing the same objective. This time however, Washington believes that the Iranians have made up their mind to go nuclear and no amount of bargaining is going to change that. At the same time, they want to avoid doing anything in the way of negotiations that would bolster the legitimacy of Iran's ruling theocrats. As Rice said once, "I don't think the unelected mullahs who run that regime are a good thing for either the Iranian people or for the region, [which] is going in quite a different direction."

Iran's refusal in agreeing to end its uranium-enrichment activities could prompt Europe to take the entire matter to the U.N. Security Council where, as the Americans hope, would push for tougher multilateral sanctions.

Although it is true that Russia and China, as two of Iran's key trading partners and weapons suppliers, could pose formidable obstacles to passing any kind of resolution, Washington knows it has few good alternatives.

For all the recent talk of American commandos secretly staking out potential targets inside Iran, it is questionable as to whether all the country's dispersed and well-hidden nuclear facilities can be destroyed.

Intelligence on Iran's programs is incomplete, and the White House is mindful of violent reprisals against Coalition forces in Iraq by Iranian-backed militias. Israel is also reluctant to resort to the same pre-emptive blow used against Saddam Hussein's Osirak reactor in 1981. A similar strike against would ignite retaliation by the Iranian-backed terrorist group Hizballah, which could shell Tel Aviv from its perch in southern Lebanon.

As a last resort, the Americans are quietly hoping that regime change will occur in Iran before a nuclear bomb materializes. The upcoming Iranian Presidential election in the middle of this year could bring some sort reprieve if a moderate were elected. However, Washington would still have to consider cutting some sort of a deal, offering anything from a nonaggression treaty to ending its long-standing sanction to Iran's entry into the World Trade Organization. Hard-liners in Washington will not be happy.

But with Iraq still raging and the North Koreans pursuing similiar nuclear goals, the Bush Administration realizes that a stop-gap deal or compromise with Tehran will have to do for the time being.

Tuesday, February 01, 2005

Why a free Iraq will Work

When Prime Minister John Howard was in Baghdad for Anzac Day last year, one of his meetings involved Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

Barzani is the leader of Kurdistan, a relatively peaceful, humane and broadly democratic enclave in northern Iraq that has been under US protection for more than a decade.

Like Turkey, Kurdistan demolishes the myth that Middle East Muslims do not want or cannot manage a democratic society. Being a little baffled by Anzac Day, Barzani was naturally excited to meet Howard. He wanted to understand the importance of Gallipoli in the Australian psyche.

Barzani was confused by the inscrutable Australianness of Anzac Day. "How can you celebrate being defeated militarily by the Turks?" he asked. Howard did his best to respond succinctly and amicably, but the Kurd still went away baffled. Anzac Day is popular? You voluntarily celebrate being beaten by the Turks? Strange and wondrous people, these Australians.

Obviously, Australian democracy, viewed from Kurdish eyes, is a fathomless veil of occidental mystery.

One would do as well to bear this in mind because emerging Iraqi democracy, is going to look pretty strange compared to the Western model. This will be world's first Shi'ite Arab democracy in the Middle East.

The Iraqi elections this week were a magnificent moment in Iraqi history and a giant step forward for the aims of the coalition.

Most of the hatred aimed at George W. Bush and John Howard border on the deranged. Conspiracy theories have been driven into insane formulations - that the Iraqis voted because they were forced to. The truth is that sometimes, there are things that are just that good to be true.

First of all, nothing is decided yet. The success of the election, though a significant step in the right direction, does not guarantee the survival and success of Iraq's budding democracy.

What the election rightly demonstrates beyond doubt, is that the insurgents do not represent majority Iraqi opinion. Most Iraqis see this as a rightful exercise in self-determination that had been denied them for a greater part of the century. They will co-operate with the processes that have been initiated as long as these have a reasonable chance of working.

The emergence of a Shi'ite-dominated government is nothing to panic about either. When sixty per cent of Iraq is Shia, what are people expecting? In a democracy, the dominant ethnic group is going to have a dominant say in government, no matter how it's organised.

Fears of Iraqi Shi'ites turning out to be agents of the Iranians or Islamic extremists are unfounded. The doomsday scenerio of Shi'ite Iraq succeeding to join Iran are equally perposterous. The Shi'ites in Iraq are Arab, the Iranians are Persian. Secular Iraqi Shi'ites know full well the depressed and repressed state Iran has become under religous rule. Iraqi Shi'ites are also well aware that forty per cent of their nation are made up of Sunni Arab and Kurds. They have no illusions that communal co-operation is essential to making Iraq work.

This election represents a milestone with Iraqis taking responsibility of their own democratic destiny for the first time. The key now is producing an effective Iraqi military that can fight and defeat the insurgents.

The current insurgency is the most serious obstacle standing in the way of a secure Iraq. However modern insurgencies have been defeated in the end, albeit often over a very long period. The elections have shown that Iraqis want a democratic future and are prepared to take risks for it. The question of training their soldiers is essentially technical and must be divorced from any form of political ideology.

Some argue that the new Iraq will not need a standing army, that a conventional police force supported by thirty thousand highly-trained counter-insurgency forces would be sufficient. However with Iran watching next door, the need for a standing army to defeat all external threats still apply. Responsible and credible military service would help forge an integrated society and national identity.

Pessimists point out that Iraq's society is too emphasied on the Kurdish, Sunni and Shia identities, while too little is placed on tribal groups, which are an important organising principle of Iraqi society. The counter argument is that big-city urbanisation has weakened tribalism to the point that it is no longer an effective basis for military organisation.

In addition, ethnic militias have shown great willingness to fight the insurgents. This aspect is highly beneficial and local communities should be encouraged to take charge of their own security, albeit with strong support from the state military.

This process is called Iraqification of the security effort. This is comparable to the policy of Vietnamisation during the Vietnam War, where America transferred major portions of security responsibility to the armed forces of South Vietnam.

Given the fall of South Vietnam, Vietnamisation is automatically seen to represent failure. In fact, Vietnamisation was highly successful and resulted in the defeat of the Viet Cong insurgency. When South Vietnam fell to the communists in April 1975, it came as a result of an invasion by a conventional North Vietnamese army supported by the Chinese and the Soviets.

As a consequence of American enfeeblement brought about by the Watergate scandal, the South Vietnamese were cut off from American supplies. More importantly, they were deprived of American air support, which would have devastated the columns of North Vietnamese armour heading into South Vietnam.

With the exception of Iran, Iraq does not have any immediate external threats. It will continue to enjoy American military support for a long time. Therefore, Iraqification is the right policy for nation building, not only for its own security but also for its identity as a nation. It will take a couple of years to realize but the chances of success is reasonable.