Tuesday, February 01, 2005

Why a free Iraq will Work

When Prime Minister John Howard was in Baghdad for Anzac Day last year, one of his meetings involved Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

Barzani is the leader of Kurdistan, a relatively peaceful, humane and broadly democratic enclave in northern Iraq that has been under US protection for more than a decade.

Like Turkey, Kurdistan demolishes the myth that Middle East Muslims do not want or cannot manage a democratic society. Being a little baffled by Anzac Day, Barzani was naturally excited to meet Howard. He wanted to understand the importance of Gallipoli in the Australian psyche.

Barzani was confused by the inscrutable Australianness of Anzac Day. "How can you celebrate being defeated militarily by the Turks?" he asked. Howard did his best to respond succinctly and amicably, but the Kurd still went away baffled. Anzac Day is popular? You voluntarily celebrate being beaten by the Turks? Strange and wondrous people, these Australians.

Obviously, Australian democracy, viewed from Kurdish eyes, is a fathomless veil of occidental mystery.

One would do as well to bear this in mind because emerging Iraqi democracy, is going to look pretty strange compared to the Western model. This will be world's first Shi'ite Arab democracy in the Middle East.

The Iraqi elections this week were a magnificent moment in Iraqi history and a giant step forward for the aims of the coalition.

Most of the hatred aimed at George W. Bush and John Howard border on the deranged. Conspiracy theories have been driven into insane formulations - that the Iraqis voted because they were forced to. The truth is that sometimes, there are things that are just that good to be true.

First of all, nothing is decided yet. The success of the election, though a significant step in the right direction, does not guarantee the survival and success of Iraq's budding democracy.

What the election rightly demonstrates beyond doubt, is that the insurgents do not represent majority Iraqi opinion. Most Iraqis see this as a rightful exercise in self-determination that had been denied them for a greater part of the century. They will co-operate with the processes that have been initiated as long as these have a reasonable chance of working.

The emergence of a Shi'ite-dominated government is nothing to panic about either. When sixty per cent of Iraq is Shia, what are people expecting? In a democracy, the dominant ethnic group is going to have a dominant say in government, no matter how it's organised.

Fears of Iraqi Shi'ites turning out to be agents of the Iranians or Islamic extremists are unfounded. The doomsday scenerio of Shi'ite Iraq succeeding to join Iran are equally perposterous. The Shi'ites in Iraq are Arab, the Iranians are Persian. Secular Iraqi Shi'ites know full well the depressed and repressed state Iran has become under religous rule. Iraqi Shi'ites are also well aware that forty per cent of their nation are made up of Sunni Arab and Kurds. They have no illusions that communal co-operation is essential to making Iraq work.

This election represents a milestone with Iraqis taking responsibility of their own democratic destiny for the first time. The key now is producing an effective Iraqi military that can fight and defeat the insurgents.

The current insurgency is the most serious obstacle standing in the way of a secure Iraq. However modern insurgencies have been defeated in the end, albeit often over a very long period. The elections have shown that Iraqis want a democratic future and are prepared to take risks for it. The question of training their soldiers is essentially technical and must be divorced from any form of political ideology.

Some argue that the new Iraq will not need a standing army, that a conventional police force supported by thirty thousand highly-trained counter-insurgency forces would be sufficient. However with Iran watching next door, the need for a standing army to defeat all external threats still apply. Responsible and credible military service would help forge an integrated society and national identity.

Pessimists point out that Iraq's society is too emphasied on the Kurdish, Sunni and Shia identities, while too little is placed on tribal groups, which are an important organising principle of Iraqi society. The counter argument is that big-city urbanisation has weakened tribalism to the point that it is no longer an effective basis for military organisation.

In addition, ethnic militias have shown great willingness to fight the insurgents. This aspect is highly beneficial and local communities should be encouraged to take charge of their own security, albeit with strong support from the state military.

This process is called Iraqification of the security effort. This is comparable to the policy of Vietnamisation during the Vietnam War, where America transferred major portions of security responsibility to the armed forces of South Vietnam.

Given the fall of South Vietnam, Vietnamisation is automatically seen to represent failure. In fact, Vietnamisation was highly successful and resulted in the defeat of the Viet Cong insurgency. When South Vietnam fell to the communists in April 1975, it came as a result of an invasion by a conventional North Vietnamese army supported by the Chinese and the Soviets.

As a consequence of American enfeeblement brought about by the Watergate scandal, the South Vietnamese were cut off from American supplies. More importantly, they were deprived of American air support, which would have devastated the columns of North Vietnamese armour heading into South Vietnam.

With the exception of Iran, Iraq does not have any immediate external threats. It will continue to enjoy American military support for a long time. Therefore, Iraqification is the right policy for nation building, not only for its own security but also for its identity as a nation. It will take a couple of years to realize but the chances of success is reasonable.

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